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Intoxication and Opinion Evidence
John E. Martindale*
T MUST BE SAID at the outset that there are many problems in
connection with the rules of evidence which an article as
short as this one cannot hope to touch upon. Among these is
the relevance of intoxication to particular issues. It must be as-
sumed that the evidence sought to be introduced is material and
relevant. With this assumption we will consider three areas of
intoxication evidence: lay opinion, expert opinion and hospital
records. These are the three main areas involving the intro-
duction of an opinion as to intoxicated condition.
Lay Opinion
It is a generally accepted rule that a layman may testify as
to the intoxicated condition of another person.1 Whether this is
because his testimony is considered to be fact or because it is an
exception to the rule against opinion evidence is open to some
argument. The difference between fact and opinion is often a
tenuous one at best.2 Where the physical state of a person is
at issue, one authority distinguishes between the two by the
test of whether the "instantaneous conclusion of the mind" was
derived from facts presented "at one and the same time" (fact),
or "successively perceived" (opinion).3 In the case of intoxica-
tion, the distinction seems hardly worth propagating, and it is
little wonder there is disagreement among the courts.
Under the so called "composite facts" exception to the
opinion evidence rule a layman is allowed to testify as to his
opinion when it is not practicable to place before the jury all
the primary facts upon which his opinion is founded. It is a corol-
lary of this rule, that the witness must, to the extent that it is
possible, testify as to the primary facts on which his opinion is
based. The question of a person's intoxication has long been
considered to be within the composite facts exception to the gen-
eral rule against the admission of lay opinion evidence.
Where a person's intoxication is itself considered to be a
matter of fact, the witness would not be required to state the
*A.B., Harvard University; a Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 20 Am. Jur., Evidence § 876.
2 7 Wigmore, Evidence 736.
3 McKelvey, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 325 (5th ed. 1944).
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primary facts he observed in order to make his conclusion ad-
missible into evidence.4 He would, of course, be open to cross-
examination on these facts. But, where such testimony is con-
sidered opinion, it ordinarily must be accompanied by a narra-
tion of the primary facts on which it is based, 5 and it is error
to exclude testimony as to these facts.6 There appears to be no
general agreement as to whether this must be done before or
after the opinion is introduced, but the cases cited7 generally ac-
cept the idea that the better practice is to state facts first and
then opinion.
Whether the witness is considered to be testifying to fact or
opinion, there is no disagreement over the rule that he must
have had actual knowledge from his own observations." He must
have been in a position to observe the intoxicated party or he can-
not testify as to his condition.9 It is not required, however, that
the witness have observed the person at the particular time in
question. Intoxication at a particular time may be proven cir-
cumstantially by testimony as to prior or subsequent intoxica-
tion within such a time that the condition may be supposed to be
continuous.10
4 Vandeveer v. Preston, 13 Ill. App. 2d 29, 140 N. E. 2d 521 (1957); Ed-
wards v. City of Worcester, 172 Mass. 104, 51 N. E. 447 (1898); State v.
Blackwood, 162 La. 266, 110 S. 417 (1926).
5 Felska v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 152 N. Y. 339, 46 N. E. 613
(1897); Limbach v. Forum Lunch Co., 258 S. W. 451 (Mo. App. 1924); Lau-
bach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 A. 88 (1925); Lloyds Casualty Co. v. Bruck-
ner, 56 S. W. 2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); American Bauxite Co. v. Dunn,
120 Ark. 1, 178 S. W. 934 (1915); Com. v. Eyler, 217 Pa. 512, 66 A. 746, 11
L. R. A. (N. S.) 639 (1907); City of Springfield v. Moxley, 24 Ohio L. Abs.
601 (1937); Turner v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 161 Pa. Super. 16, 53 A. 2d
849 (1947).
Wigmore criticizes this rule. 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1922, p. 19.
Contra: State v. Cather, 121 Iowa 106, 96 N. W. 722 (1903); Daniels v.
State, 155 Tenn. 549, 296 S. W. 20 (1927). But these cases, and those they
cite, while using the term "opinion," treat intoxication as a fact.
See also: Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N. W. 2d 79 (1952);
and Reinheimer v. City of Greenville, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 573 (1930). Both
cases say no fact testimony is required, but seem to treat the situation as
one of expert testimony, where facts are not required to support opinion
testimony. In both cases, the witness was a police officer.
6 Martin v, Philadelphia, 348 Pa. 232, 35 A. 2d 317 (1944).
7. Supra note 5.
8 Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Or. 621, 87 P. 2d 209 (1939); Gaynor v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp., 183 F. 2d 482 (1950). Many cases are cited in 20 Am.
Jur. Evidence 737, n. 8.
9 Morris v. City Transfer & Yellow Taxi Co., 220 Ky. 219, 294 S. W. 1030
(1927); Atkinson v. Mitchell, 62 Montg. 303 (Pa. Com. P1.); see also Law
v. Gallegher, 39 Del. 189, 197 A. 479 (1938).
10 Ackerman v. Kogut, 117 Vt. 40, 84 A. 2d 131 (1951).
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Expert Testimony
Constitutionality
Expert testimony almost necessarily involves the various
scientific tests for blood alcohol and all their attendant prob-
lems. The constitutionality of these tests has received a great
deal of attention in the last twenty years. Usually the tests are
questioned on the basis of self-incrimination, unreasonable search
and seizure, or violation of due process of law.
Historically, the privilege against self-incrimination arose as
a solely testimonial privilege.1 1 That is to say it applied only to
verbal or written testimony elicited through compulsion. 12 The
reasoning behind the rule was the fact that such testimony was
considered to be unreliable, and the United States Supreme Court
has held that this privilege does not apply in such a manner as
to exclude a person's body as evidence. 13 It is on this basis that
photographs, fingerprints, handwriting samples, and physical fea-
tures have been admitted into evidence against a defendant even
when the evidence was secured through the use of compulsion.
14
Obviously, where the defendant consents to a test for in-
toxication, there is no problem since the privilege against self-
incrimination may be waived. It is where force is used that the
problem arises. The problem has been avoided to some extent by
the courts, either by their refusal to find any compulsion under
the circumstances of the case, 15 or by taking the negative ap-
11 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2263 (1961 Ed.).
12 Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245 (1910).
13 Ibid.
14 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2265 (1961 Ed.).
15 People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 492 (1954); Novak v.
Dist. of Columbia, 82 U. S. App. D. C. 95, 49 A. 2d 88, rev. 160 F. 2d 588
(1946).
One astounding example of this refusal to find compulsion is the case
of People v. Kiss, 125 Cal. App. 2d 138, 269 P. 2d 924 (1954), where the
defendant testified he had been struck by an officer in the face and stomach
before the intoximeter test and that he submitted to the test because he
was afraid he would be again beaten by the officers. Admitting the truth
of the testimony for the sake of argument, the court held that, "The taking
of evidence from one suspected of crime is not in itself unlawful. It will
be excluded only where the accused is by threats and punishment so ter-
rorized into submission that to admit it would be a mockery and a pre-
tense of a trial." The evidence was held admissible. It should be said for
the court that it was probably leaning toward the idea that the privilege
is solely testimonial, but what of the due process clause? Is this any
better than the stomach pumping in the Rochin case cited below? Appar-
ently this court thought so.
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proach that the defendant must actively object to the test or be
held to have waived his privilege. 16
Logically, the question of compulsion should be no more
material when scientific tests for alcohol are involved than it is
where involuntary fingerprinting or display of the physical fea-
tures is involved. But, with only a few notable exceptions, 17
courts have refused to state positively that the privilege against
self-incrimination is solely testimonial, and will not bar the in-
troduction of blood alcohol evidence elicited by compulsion. It
is interesting to note that the Kansas statute states that anyone
who operates a motor vehicle on the public highways of that state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to submit to a chemi-
cal test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of his blood.1s Presumably the
basis for this is the argument that driving a motor vehicle is a
privilege which the State of Kansas has a right to withhold.
The issue of compulsion is clearly important to the question
of whether or not the defendant's right to due process of law
has been violated. But the quantitative question of how much
force is required before a violation occurs is an open one. In the
case of Rochin vs. California,19 the Supreme Court held that
police offcers could not force a prisoner to have his stomach
pumped to recover evidence.20  That case appears to stand for
the rule that evidence which is secured by conduct which "shocks
the conscience" and "offends the decencies of civilized conduct"
is inadmissible. It is a rule which obviously places a premium
16 A number of cases involving tests on unconscious persons or persons
otherwise not competent to consent are collected at 8 Wigmore, Evidence
391, n. 5. See particularly Schutt v. MadDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N. Y. S. 2d
116 (1954); and Breithaupt v. Abraham, 352 U. S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 1 L.
Ed. 2d 448 (1957).
17 State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P. 2d 261 (1953), where the defendant was
strapped in a chair while a blood sample was taken. People v. Conterno,
170 Cal. App. 2d 817, 339 P. 2d 968 (1959); Com. v. Statti, 73 A. 2d 688, 166
Pa. Super. 577 (1950).
See also: People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 168
P. 2d 443 (1946); Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N. W. 2d
348 (1945).
The case of Alexander v. State, 305 P. 2d 572 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956),
contains an excellent discussion of the entire problem.
18 Kan. Gen. Stat. 1949, Supp. 1955, § 8-1001 et seq.
19 342 U. S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1951).
20 In actual fact, the struggle in the Rochin case occurred in the defendant's
home after the officers broke in. He was arrested and taken to a hospital,
and there was no evidence that he struggled there to prevent his stomach
being pumped.
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on the prisoner's violence in resisting the invasion of his per-
son. Six years after the Rochin case, in Breithaupt v. Abra-
ham,21 the Supreme Court held that the taking of a blood sample
from an unconscious person to be used in evidence against him
did not violate due process for the reason that there was nothing
"brutal" or "offensive" involved. The lack of conscious consent
was of no effect.
The "shocks the conscience" method of delineating due
process of law is indeed an indefinite standard. Perhaps the only
thing that can be said of it with any degree of certainty is the
fact that the members of the Supreme Court are themselves dis-
satisfied with it. The recent decision in Mapp v. Ohio22 may, in
fact, foreshadow the disappearance of that nebulous standard.23
The actual issue of the Mapp case was unlawful search and
seizure, and on that point it has directly reversed the earlier
position of the Court. There are very few cases involving ob-
jections to the introduction of blood alcohol tests into evidence
on the basis of unlawful search and seizure. This is partly for
the reason that a person under arrest may have his person and
surroundings searched. And even when the search was unlaw-
ful, in the past this has been no objection to the evidence pro-
duced by the search since state courts were not bound by the
federal rule that such evidence was admissible. In Mapp v.
Ohio,24 the Supreme Court made evidence obtained by unlawful
search inadmissible in state courts. It would seem that this
should become one of the future grounds for objection to the use
of evidence gained by unlawful violation of the person of a de-
fendant to obtain blood alcohol samples.
21 352 U. S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 1 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1957).
22 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
23 Id. at 1697. "Only one thing emerged with complete clarity from the
Irvine case-that is that seven Justices rejected the "shocks the conscience"
constitutional standard enunciated in the Wolf and Rochin cases .... As
I understand the court's opinion in this case, we again reject the confus-
ing "shock the conscience standard." This case is also enlightening as to
the court's attitude on the question of self incrimination. Justice Clark,
speaking for himself only, says, "I concurred in the reversal [of the opinion
of the lower court] of the Rochin case, but on the ground that the Four-
teenth Amendment made the Fifth Amendment's provision against self-
incrimination applicable to the states, and that, given a broad rather than
a narrow construction that provision barred the introduction of [evidence
by means of stomach pump] just as much as it would have forbidden the
use of words Rochin might have been coerced to speak."
24 Supra note 22.
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Admissibility of Test Results
Research has failed to uncover a single state which now re-
fuses to admit scientific blood alcohol tests on the basis that they
are scientifically unreliable, although at least one state still re-
quires testimony as to the generally recognized reliability and ac-
curacy of such tests before their results can be introduced into
evidence.2 5 At least thirty states have authorized the tests by
statute.26 Any question of scientific unreliability now runs to
the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility. 27
The qualifying foundation which must be laid for the par-
ticular test before its results are admitted seems to vary from
court to court. However, the requirement is generally as set
forth in Hill v. State,28 requiring proof that the chemicals used
were compounded properly; that the operator of the machine
was qualified in his job and that he and his machine were under
the periodic supervision of one who had an understanding of
the scientific theory; and testimony by a witness who was quali-
fied to calculate and translate the reading of the instrument
scale into percentage of alcohol in the blood.29 In addition,
where a sample is taken from the defendant and transported
from one person or place to another, there is a requirement of
proof of the identity and unchanged condition of the sample.30
25 Rivers v. Black, 259 Ala. 528, 68 S. 2d 2 (1953).
20 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 28-692; Ark. Stat. 1947, § 15-1031.1; Colo. Rev.
Stat. 1953, § 13-4-30; Del. Code. Ann., Tit. 11 § 3507; Ga. Code. Ann. 1937,
Cum. Supp. 1955, § 68-1625; Hawaii Rev. L. 1955, § 311-29; Idaho Code 1948,
Cum. Supp, 1955, § 49-520-2; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 9512-144; Ind. Stat. Ann.
1952, Cum. Supp. 1955, § 47-2003; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1949, Supp. 1955, § 8-1001
et seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1955, § 189.520; Me. Rev. Stat. 1954, c. 22 § 150;
Minn. Stat. Ann. §169.12; Mont. Rev. Code. 1947 §32-2142(2); Neb. Rev.
Stat. 1943, Reissue of 1952, § 39-727.01; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.055; N. H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. 1955, § 262:20; N. J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.1; N. Y. Vehicle and
Traffic Laws c. 71, § 70(5); N. D. Laws 1953, c. 247; Or. Rev. Stat. 1955,
§ 483.630; S. C. Code 1952 § 46-344; S. D. Code 1939, Supp. 1952, § 44.0302-1;
Tenn. Code Ann., 1955, § 59-1032 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 41-6-44;
Va. Code 1950, Supp. 1956, § 18-75.-1 et seq.; Wash. Rev. Code 1951,
§ 46.56.010; W. Va. Code, § 1721 (331a) [2a]; Wis. Laws 1955, c. 510; Wyo.
Comp. Stat. 1945, Cum. Supp. 1955, § 60-414.
27 People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 NE 2d 562 (1951); State v. Olivas,
77 Ariz. 118, 267 P. 2d 893 (1954); McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235
S. W. 2d 173 (1951).
28 158 Tex. Crim. 313, 256 S. W. 2d 93 (1953).
29 See also Schacht v. State, 154 Neb. 858, 50 S. W. 2d 78 (1932); and
Alexander v. State, 305 P. 2d 572 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
30 21 A. L. R. 2d 1216.
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The recent case of Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc.3 1
points up the fact that there may be a different standard of
foundation for civil cases than the standard set for criminal
cases, since civil actions require proof only by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Qualification of the Witness
The experiential requirement a court may make before a
witness is allowed to testify as an expert should logically depend
on the subject of his testimony. And the reported cases indicate
that the standard is different depending on whether the witness
will testify as to the mechanical process of making the test, or
will testify as to the result of the test in terms of quantity of al-
cohol in the blood, or will give his opinion as to intoxication
based on the alcohol content shown.
The mere running of the test is essentially a mechanical act,
and the person qualified to perform this act may not be qualified
to evaluate the chemicals the test produces in terms of percentage
of alcohol in the blood. For this reason, in many cases the
introduction of the test involves two witnesses even before the
test can be evaluated in terms of the subject's intoxication. In
Jackson v. State,32 a police officer who had had two days train-
ing in the operation of an intoximeter and who had given ap-
proximately two hundred such tests was held qualified to ad-
minister such a test. However, the testimony that the result
was .17% alcohol was given by a toxicologist who also stated
that the analysis of the properly identified test had been
made under his supervision by a laboratory assistant. In People
v. Lewis,3 3 a Navy corpsman with six years of hospital experience
including the running of blood tests was held qualified to testify
as to the making of a Bogans blood test. Testimony as to the fact
that the result was .222% alcohol, however, was offered by a
criminologist of the San Diego Police Department. This dif-
ference in qualification required to testify to the test or its re-
31 176 N. E. 2d 757 (Ill. 1961), holding that the foundation laid for intro-
duction of evidence of blood analysis need not preclude every possibility
of doubt as to identity of specimen or possibility of change of condition
in blood. "The plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence and by
the highest degree of proof available to her that the blood sample analyzed
was taken from decedent and was in an unchanged condition when
analyzed."
32 Jackson v. State, 262 S. W. 2d 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953).
33 People v. Lewis, 152 Cal. App. 2d 824, 313 P. 2d 972 (1957).
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sults is partly a by-product of the hearsay rule. Thus, it has
been held that where the police technician was unable to trans-
late the results of the test into alcohol content in the blood from
his own knowledge, and was forced to rely on a chart which he
did not himself understand, the evidence was inadmissible as
hearsay.34 However, if the witness has sufficient understanding
of the formula and calculation required to make the transla-
tion himself, then the use of appropriate charts would not consti-
tute hearsay under the doctrine that reference by an expert to
a known authority to support his opinion does not constitute an
introduction of the medical textbook or authority as original
evidence, but as corroboration of the expert's opinion.
35
Not all courts, however, are this strict in the degree of ex-
pertness required to qualify a witness to testify to the results of
an intoxication test. In Alexander v. State,3 6 Oklahoma relaxed
its earlier and stricter ruling,3" at least as far as the Harger
drunkometer test. The court held that when there is ample evi-
dence to show that the witness was competent to conduct the
test so as to obtain the required readings, he could also testify
as to the readings, whether or not he could himself work the
formula by which the machine produced the readings, or a
parallel chart translated the readings into blood alcohol. In the
words of the court,38
One is allowed to testify as to the time of day by having
looked at a watch or clock; the temperature by the reading
of a thermometer; the speed of an automobile by reference
to the speedometer; the operation and results from adding
a column of figures on an adding machine, and the distance
between points within Oklahoma by having referred to an
official map of the State. We conclude that Sgt. Haddock
was competent to give the readings he found on the gaso-
meter cylinder or accompanying chart of the drunko-
meter.3 9
One may well question the parallels drawn by the Okla-
homa court since one does not look at a chart after looking at
34 Fortune v. State, 197 Tenn. 691, 277 S. W. 2d 381 (1955); Hill v. State, 158
Tex. Crim. 313, 256 S. W. 2d 93 (1953).
35 Hill v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 313, 256 S. W. 2d 93 (1953).
36 305 P. 2d 572 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
37 Set forth in Riddle v. State, 288 P. 2d 761 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955).
38 Alexander v. State, supra note 36, at 588.
39 The court also comments, however, that it would require an expert to
interpret the meaning of the reading.
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the clock in order to tell time. But, rightly or wrongly this ap-
proach seems to be the more common. Thus, a doctor's assistant
who made a test under the doctor's supervision and who had
helped the doctor make tests on numerous occasions was held
qualified to state the result of the test.40 A medical technician
at a hospital who had gone to college two years taking courses
in chemistry, biology, and bacteriology, followed by one year
internship in a hospital as a technician and some five to six
years work as a laboratory technician was held qualified to state
the results of a blood alcohol test even though she had only made
four such tests. 4 1 In Commonwealth v. Mummert,42 there is
dicta to the effect that the witness "showed his qualifications in
the operation of the drunkometer by having trained under (a
certain superior officer of the city) Police Force." And, in
Omohundro v. Arlington County,43 a police officer was allowed
to testify to the results of a drunkometer test when testimony
showed that he was "a high school graduate, had not attended
college, nor taken a course in chemistry; that he had not made
a control test of the Drunk-o-Meter machine immediately before
or after the test was given to the defendant; and that he did not
know whether or not the machine was accurate; that his entire
training in the use of the machine consisted of approximately two
days' instruction, and he had never had any laboratory training
or instruction in the analysis and evaluation of such tests."
Under the above cases the requirement that a witness be an
expert to testify to the result of a scientific intoxication test
seems to be dwindling to non-existence. But, there are obvious
limits to such a thing. The following colloquy took place in State
v. Mannix44 after a police captain was called to testify as to the
results of an alcometer test:
"Q. What was the result of the test?
A. Twenty-five.
Q. Are you familiar with the National Safety Council
standards, Captain Bouillion?
A. Yes, sir.
40 State v. Haner, 231 Iowa 348, 1 N. W. 2d 91 (1941).
41 State v. Deming, 66 N. M. 175, 344 P. 2d 481 (1959).
42 55 Lanc. L. Rev. 245, aff'd 183 Pa. Super. 638, 133 A. 2d 301, cert. den.
356 U. S. 939 (1957).
43 194 Va. 773, 75 S. E. 2d 496 (1953).
44 101 Ohio App. 33, 137 N. E. 2d 572 (1956).
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Q. Using the result of the defendant's test in relation to
the National Safety Council standards, what would that in-
dicate as to the defendant's condition?
A. He was intoxicated."
On cross examination, the witness was asked the following:
"Q. Do you know anything at all about this machine?
A. No, I don't know a thing about it."
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court
of Ohio said,
The testimony of persons skilled in the mechanics and use
of modern machines and equipment to test or determine
bodily conditions is generally accepted in courts as proper
evidence. However, this rule does not extend to permitting
an unskilled person who admits he knows nothing about
such an instrument to give expert testimony upon the result
of a test made with it.
The question of expert opinion actually is not involved
either in the running of the test or the translation of the result
into percentage of alcohol in the blood. Opinion testimony is first
involved only when a conclusion as to the subject's intoxication
is drawn from the percentage figure. Courts seem to be in agree-
ment that a higher standard of academic background and ex-
perience is required to give this opinion testimony than is re-
quired for the testimony as to the test and its result. But, again,
the courts are not in agreement as to what that standard is. In
Tarrock v. Kingston,4 5 testimony of a hemotologist as to a "recog-
nized standard" by which intoxication is presumed to occur from
the percentage of alcohol found in the blood was excluded on
the basis that he was not a physician or otherwise shown to be
qualified from personal experience to be able to give an opinion.
Yet, in Kallnbach v. People48 a medical technologist was per-
mitted to testify that "anything over one point five is considered
under the influence of alcohol," and "would cause an impair-
ment of his ability to drive." The report indicates that the
technologist's work involved blood analyses, but it is silent as to
any previous experience in interpreting or evaluating blood al-
cohol tests.
No doubt this lack of uniformity results from the fact that
whether or not an expert is properly qualified is considered to
45 279 App. Div. 693, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 16 (1951).
46 125 Colo. 144, 242 P. 2d 222 (1952).
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be almost entirely within the discretion of the trial court. Ap-
pellate courts are slow to interfere with the ruling of a trial
court on this matter unless it involves an abuse of discretion.
47
The result is that the witness' qualifications unavoidably run to
the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.
Generally speaking, a witness seems to be qualified to evalu-
ate blood alcohol tests if he has a background in medicine, chem-
istry, or toxicology and has had substantial past experience with
the type of alcohol test sought to be introduced and evaluated.
All of the following have been held to be properly qualified to
testify as to their expert opinion on the matter: an expert
hematologist who had conducted over 1,500 tests for blood al-
cohol,48 a graduate chemist who had taken special courses in
chemical tests for intoxication and had given more than 500 such
tests in two years; 49 a chemist at an army camp who testified
as to his long experience in laboratory work and that the test
was made according to U. S. Army standards; 50 a graduate
chemist and toxicologist who had performed over 3,500 tests for
blood alcohol; 51 a Ph.D. in chemistry who had "quite a bit" of
experience in making tests and observing the reaction of sub-
jects having different percentages of alcohol in their blood; 52
a professor of biochemistry and toxicology who had conducted
"thousands" of tests; 53 a professor of toxicology who had made
"innumerable" tests;54 a research biochemist who had been work-
ing with a Harger breath tester for ten to eleven months; 55 and,
a police officer with two and one half years of chemistry in col-
lege and attendance at special courses in breath tests for alcohol
47 2 Wigmore Evidence, § 561. Wigmore suggests that the future rule should
be, "The experiential qualifications of a particular witness are invariably de-
termined by the trial judge and will not be reviewed on appeal." What
then, of situations like the Mannix case, supra note 44?
48 State v. Moore, 245 N. C. 158, 95 S. E. 2d 548 (1956).
49 People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N. E. 2d 567 (1951).
50 Macon Busses, Inc. v. Dashiell, 73 Ga. App. 108, 35 S. E. 2d 666 (1945).
The report is silent as to the witness's formal schooling in chemistry or his
own past experience with blood alcohol tests.
51 Cloud v. Market St. R. Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 92, 168 P. 2d 191 (1946). His
tests, however, had been on deceased persons and the testimony showed he
had had access to the official reports showing the conduct of such persons
prior to death.
52 Bryant v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 98, 261 S. W. 2d 728 (1953).
53 People v. Bobczyk, supra note 49.
54 People v. Bobczyk, supra note 49.
55 McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S. W. 2d 173 (1950).
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and who "had been in charge of training and supervising opera-
tors" of the breath tester.56
To a certain extent, statutes are beginning to make the ex-
pert's opinion testimony unnecessary. Legislatures, recognizing
the scientific accuracy of the blood alcohol tests have begun pass-
ing statutes making a given percentage of blood alcohol prima
facie evidence of intoxication. 57
Hospital Records
Underlying the problem of introducing hospital records to
prove intoxication are two basic considerations-the doctor-
patient privilege, and the rule against hearsay evidence. In
jurisdictions where the privilege is recognized, all or the greatest
part of a hospital record may be inadmissible even though it is
brought under some exception to the hearsay rule.5s Thus, the
portion of the record which is admissible may be no more than
the fact that a certain person was a patient at the hospital, the
names of his doctors, and the extent of his stay.59 The statutory
physician-patient privilege, however, is in derogation of the
common law. And a strict construction of the privilege has been
held to allow introduction of the record where the communica-
tion by the patient was made to a nurse rather than a physician.60
But, if the jurisdiction involved does not recognize the
privilege,6 1 or the privilege has been waived,0 2 or if for some
other reason the privilege is held not to attach under the par-
56 Fluitt v. State, 333 S. W. 2d 144 (Tex. Crim. 1960).
57 N. Y. Vehicle & Traffic Laws § 70(5); Wis. Stat. § 53.13(2); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 28-692. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such statutes, see
46 A. L. R. 2d 1176.
58 Ost v. Ulring, 207 Minn. 500, 292 N. W. 207 (1940); Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co.
v. Mich. Asylum, 178 Mich. 193, 144 N. W. 538 (1913); Smart v. Kansas City,
208 Mo. 162, 105 S. W. 709 (1907); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E.
2d 245 (1947); Lamarand v. Nat. L. & Acc. Ins. Co., 58 Ohio App. 415, 16
N. E. 2d 701 (1937); Casson v. Schoenfeld, 166 Wis. 401, 166 N. W. 23 (1918);
Mehegan v. Faber, 158 Wis. 645, 149 N. W. 397 (1914); Newman v. Blom,
249 Iowa 839, 89 N. W. 2d 349 (1958); 7 Wigmore Evidence § 2382; Anno. 75
A. L. R. 386, 120 A. L. R. 1140.
59 Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 839, 89 N. W. 2d 349 (1958).
60 Weis v. Weis, supra note 58; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kozlowski, 266 Wis.
641, 276 N. W. 300 (1937).
61 Florida Power & L. Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195, 182 S. 911 (1938).
62 Marx v. Parks, 39 S. W. 2d 570 (Mo. App. 1931).
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ticular facts, 63 then only the problem of the hearsay rule remains.
Many states have adopted the Uniform Business Records Evi-
dence Act,64 or have a statute similar to the Federal Shopbook
Rule.c5 Hospital records may escape the hearsay rule by quali-
fying under these acts.
A proper foundation for the introduction of hospital records
under the business records acts is laid when the following have
been shown: custody from which the record comes; identity of
the record offered as that of the patient in question; mode of
preparation; that the entries were made in the regular course of
business; and that the regular course of the hospital business was
to make records at or near the time of the act, transaction, oc-
currence, condition, or event recorded. 6 Once this is done, the
record need not be introduced by one who actually created it, so
long as it is produced by one who has the custody of the record
as a regular part of his work.67 There should be no difficulty in
admitting a patient's intoxicated condition as a part of such a
record.6 8 And the mere fact that the record contains an opinon
63 Soltanink v. Metro. L. Ins. Co., 133 Pa. Super. 139, 2 A. 2d 501 (1938);
Shepard v. Whitney Nat. Bank, 177 S. 825 (La. App. 1938), where the court
says, "We are referred to no authority which sustains the contention of
counsel to the effect that such records are privileged communications be-
tween doctor and patient." Motley v. State, 174 Miss. 568, 165 S. 296 (1936);
Weis v. Weis, supra note 58.
64 Ariz. Rev. Stat., 1956, § 12-2262; Cal. C. C. P. § 1953 et seq.; 10 Del. Code
§ 4310; Fla. Stat., 1957, § 92.36; Hawaii Rev. L., 1955, § 224-26; Idaho Code,
1947, § 9-413 et seq.; Min. Stat., 1957, § 600.01 et seq.; Mo. Rev. Stat., 1949,
§ 490.660 et seq.; Mont. Rev. Code, 1947, § 93-801-1 et seq.; Neb. Rev. Stat.,
1943, § 25-12, 108 et seq.; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1955, 521:1 et seq.; N. J.
Rev. Stat., 1937, 2A:82-34 et seq.; N. Dak. Rev. Code, 1943, § 31-0801; Ohio
Rev. Code, § 2317.40; Ore. Rev. Stat., 1953, 41.680 et seq.; Pa., 28 P. S. § 91a
et seq.; S. Dak. Code, 1939, 36.1001; Tenn. Code, 1956, § 24-712 et seq.; Vt.
Rev. Stat., 1947, § 1753 et seq.; Rev. Code Wash., 5.45.010 et seq.; Wyo. Comp.
Stat. 1945 § 3-3122 et seq.
65 28 U. S. C. § 1732; Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 7, § 415; Conn. Gen. Stat., 1958,
§ 52-180; Ga. Code, 1933, § 38-711; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 35, § 59; Mich. Comp.
L., 1948, § 617.53; Nev. Rev. Stat., 51.030; N. Mex. Stat., 1953, § 20-2-12;
N. Y. C. P. A. § 374a; R. I. Gen. L., § 9-19-13; Tex. Rev. Code, Art. 3737e
§ 1-4.
66 6 Proof of Facts 135.
67 Green v. Cleveland, 79 N. E. 2d 676 (Ohio App. 1948). (Uniform Busi-
ness Records Act.) Shaffer v. Seas Shipping Co. Inc., 127 F. Supp. 384
(1954). (Federal Shopbook Rule.)
68 "Such a record may properly include case history, diagnosis by one
qualified to make it, condition and treatment of the patient covering such
items as temperature, pulse, respiration, symptoms, food and medicines,
analysis of tissues or fluids of the body, and the behavior and complaints of
the patient." Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 1 Ohio Ops. 2d 349, 140
N. E. 2d 322 (1955).
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as to intoxication should afford no grounds for objection provided
the entry resulted from direct observation by the person making
the entry.' 9
In some jurisdictions which have no statute similar to the
Business Records Act, hospitals are required by law to keep
records. Such records would be admissible under the exception
to the hearsay rule involving official public documents.70 The
foundation required for their admission is similar to that re-
quired for admission under the Business Records Act, plus proof
that the record is maintained pursuant to statutory requirements
and that the record offered contains all the information required
by the statute. 71 And just as business records are admissible only
to show entries made in the regular course of business, records
required by statute are admissible only to prove matters required
by law to be in those records.7 2 Again, this should be no barrier
to the introduction of entries concerning the patient's intoxicated
condition.73
It would appear that if neither of the foregoing two statutes
were available, the attorney seeking to introduce hospital records
showing intoxication would have to depend on the common law
rules relating to "past recollections recorded" 74 or "regular en-
tries" 75 as exceptions to the hearsay rule. The past recollections
recorded rule is, of course, only available in situations involving
testimonial recollection of a witness on the stand, and the com-
69 D'Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 97 A. 2d 893, 38 A. L. R. 2d 772
(1953); Reed v. United Commercial Travelers, 123 F. 2d 252 (1941).
Where the opinion was not admissible because of the lack of direct ob-
servation or proof of direct observation, see: Brown v. St. Paul City R. Co.,
241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W. 2d 688 (1954); Geroeami v. Fancy Fruit & Produce
Corp., 249 App. Div. 221, 291 N. Y. S. 837 (1936); Roberto v. Nielson, 262
App. Div. 1035, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 334, aff'd 42 N. E. 2d 27 (1941).
Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446, 39 A. 2d 626 (1944), required for the
admission of such an opinion that, (1) the entry must be made contempo-
raneously with the acts which it purports to relate, (2) it must be im-
possible at the time the entries are made to anticipate reasons which might
subsequently arise for making a false entry, and (3) knowledge of the
person responsible for the entry. However, see 5 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1530 and Anno. 38 A. L. R. 2d 778.
70 Galli v. Wells, 209 Mo. App. 460, 239 S. W. 894 (1922).
71 6 Proof of Facts 145.
72 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195, 182 S. 911 (1938).
73 Clark v. Beacon Oil Co., 271 Mass. 27, 170 N. E. 836 (1930); Leonard v.
Boston Elev. R. Co., 234 Mass. 480, 125 N. E. 593 (1920); Cowan v. McDon-
nell, 330 Mass. 148, 111 N. E. 2d 759 (1953).
74 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 734, 751.
75 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1521.
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mon law "regular entries" rule requires strict unavailability of
the witness and a reasonable guarantee of the trustworthiness of
the document.
76
Professor Wigmore argues that hospital records should be
admissible merely on the identification of the original by its
keeper or on offer of a certified or sworn copy. 77 But he is
forced to concede that "No court seems yet to have sanctioned
such an exception on common law principles. Moreover, sev-
eral courts have so illiberally applied the exception for official
records and for regular entries in the course of business that
many classes of reliable hospital records have been virtually ex-
cluded from use." 78
76 6 Proof of Facts 147.
77 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1707.
78 Ibid. The reader is also referred to the large number of cases collected in
the 1959 supplement to 6 Wigmore, Evidence, listed in § 1707.
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